I. INTRODUCTION
Today, an immense amount of information exists in digital form. A large percentage of it is copyrighted contents that should only be available to authorized users. In such cases, the user is usually permitted to read (or play) the contents but should not be allowed to copy and distribute the contents. Nevertheless, unauthorized copying and distribution of digital contents occur frequently and is a major problem for many content providers.
This content-piracy problem is currently a serious concern for the movie and music industry. Due to the increasing Internet bandwidth and the emergence of more powerful portable player devices, the demand for directly downloading media contents from the Internet to an enduser's player device is on the rise. A typical copy-protection method [1] used to prevent the illegal copying of these media contents is as follows: a content provider installs his own software onto the user's player device, such as a PC, an iPod, etc. Then, the provider sends encrypted contents to the user's device. In order to obtain the keys used to decrypt and read the encrypted contents, the user must authenticate with the content provider or with a third party licensing clearinghouse. Next, the keys are sent to and hidden on the user's device. Only the content provider's installed software on that device can find and use the keys to decrypt the encrypted contents. Hence, this copy-protection method restricts the copying of contents by sending only encrypted contents over public networks, hiding keys on the user's devices, and allowing only the provider's special software to find and use these keys.
A major weakness with the existing copy-protection method described above is that the encrypted contents are sent to various kinds of player devices that do not have secure processing architectures to hide the decryption keys. In the underlying processor architectures, machine instructions, registers, memories and buses are open resources that can be controlled or accessed by the operating system (OS), application software and also by malicious software. Furthermore, since both the application software and the OS can have bugs and software vulnerabilities, hackers can use these software weaknesses to find the hidden decryption keys.
We propose a non-copyable disk (NCdisk), which is a storage device that automatically encrypts all data written into it and does not allow the plaintext form of the data to leave it except through controlled display outputs. We propose a minimal set of changes to an existing disk controller System-on-Chip (SoC) to attribute the disk with the non-copyable property. Our proposal is based on the Secret-Protection (SP) secure processor architecture [2] [3] [4] , which provides a secure environment to store critical secrets and allows only a trusted software module to access these critical secrets.
II. THREAT 
MODEL
We assume that the content provider can write a trusted software module that will be allowed to use and access critical secrets but cannot leak these secrets out. Further, we assume that any other software is un-trusted and should not be allowed to access critical secrets. The attacker is able to mount software attacks. He can monitor network transactions and probe external memories and buses. We assume that physically probing inside a chip, such as a System-on-Chip (SOC) is more difficult without destroying functionality, and hence is not in our threat model. We also do not consider side-channel attacks on a SoC III. NCDISK CONCEPT Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the NCdisk concept. The NCdisk is a data storage device, in which any digital content written into the device is automatically encrypted using a key that is generated by the NCisk that never leaves the NCdisk. All data stored on the NCdisk are in such an encrypted form, and the stored data can only be read through a set of predefined outputs, such that the digital plaintext form of the data never leaves the NCdisk.
Both plaintext data and encrypted data may be written onto the NCdisk. Each encrypted data is encrypted using a Either plaintext data or CMK-encrypted data can be input into the NCdisk. In the former case, it is first encrypted using the Device Media Key (DMK). In the latter case, the NCdisk first decrypts the data using the CMK and then re-encrypts the data using the DMK. The DMK is generated within the NCdisk and it never leaves the disk. We discuss in Section IV how to keep the DMK secret from everyone, including the user of the disk. Note also that each input data to the NCdisk is encrypted using a different DMK, as described in detail in Section V. Encrypting all the data stored on the NCdisk using the DMK protects the storage phase of the data, by ensuring that the plaintext version of the digital data never resides on the disk.
Any data stored on the NCdisk can only be read out of the disk through a pre-defined set of output channels. An encrypted digital data can be decrypted and converted to an analog format, which can then be sent out of the NCdisk. Alternatively, an encrypted digital data can be decrypted using the DMK and re-encrypted using a Player Media Key (PMK), which is only known by a trusted digital display and the NCdisk. Both the trusted digital display and the NCdisk must have a secure location to generate and use the PMK so that it is not revealed to anyone else. The PMK-encrypted data is sent out of the NCdisk. Third, if the NCdisk has an integrated display, such as a built-in LCD screen like in the iPod devices, then the NCdisk may decrypt the stored data and send the digital streaming data to the integrated display. It is assumed that it is hard for a casual attacker to siphon off information on the internal link connecting the NCdisk and its integrated display. Note that this integrated display is not foolproof against more dedicated attackers. Nevertheless, this integrated display raises the bar against possible attacks to siphon off information. In all three pre-defined output channels, the (high-quality) plaintext version of the digital data never leaves the NCdisk in the output phase of the NCdisk. To summarize, the NCdisk ensures that no one, not even the legitimate user of the NCdisk, can obtain a copy of the digital plaintext version of the data stored on the disk.
The NCdisk addresses some of the weaknesses of existing copy-protection methods. Instead of sending copyrighted movie or music contents to insecure PCs or portable media players, a content provider can instead send these contents to a user's NCdisk. In a way, the NCdisk functions like a book in that only those people who have physical possession of the NCdisk can view the contents stored on it. Just as it would be very inconvenient for a person to copy and distribute the book, a user would have a very difficult time trying to copy the original digital plaintext data stored on the NCdisk. However, unlike a book, the NCdisk provides the convenience of directly downloading and viewing copyrighted digital contents without the need to physically travel to a store. Also, an NCdisk can store many items of digital content.
IV. NCDISK SP-BASED SOC ARCHITECTURE
The NCdisk concept ultimately boils down to achieving two goals. The first goal is to enable the NCdisk to be able to store secret keys and ensure that these keys never leak out of the NCdisk. The second goal is to fully predefine how data can be read out of the NCdisk such that the original digital plaintext data is never leaked out. We do not achieve these two goals by redesigning a completely new disk architecture from scratch. Instead, we only need to be concerned with the disk controller components, which control how data is written in or read out of a disk. We achieve these two goals by implementing a SoC consisting of existing disk controller components, plus a minimal set of additions. This new SoC can then be connected to the rest of the existing disk components to turn an existing disk [5] into an NCdisk (see Figure 2 .)
The Further, not allowing any software to directly access the device key and preventing the run-time data of the TSM software from leaking out of the SoC still does not ensure that the device key will not leak out of the SoC. The TSM software must be carefully written to ensure that this trusted software does not send any infomation that can be used to detect bits of this key, out of the SoC. The TSM software for the NCdisk contains a fixed set of API functions (see Table 2 ). An The TSM_Read_Analog function decrypts the stored data, converts it into an analog format through the D/A converter, and sends it out of the NCdisk. This API function performs the analog conversion immediately after the decryption, and since interrupts are disabled, the plaintext digital data (e.g., high fidelity movie) will not leak out.
The TSM_Read_Trusted function decrypts the stored data with the DMK, re-encrypts it with the PMK, and sends encrypted digital data out of the NCDisk. Each data has its own DMK, and each trusted display may have its own PMK. The DMKs, CMKs, and PMKs are never stored anywhere. Instead, they are deleted right after encryption and rederived upon decryption by a shared key or device key by the trusted software.
Finally, the TSM_Read_Integrated function decrypts the stored data and sends it to an integrated display through the integrated display interface. Since the display is integrated with the NCdisk, we assume that it is much harder for an attacker to siphon off the data on the internal link connecting the integrated display to the NCdisk.
V. NCDISK SECURITY PROTOCOL
Before presenting the NCdisk security protocol, we first examine an online movie download scenario for using the NCdisk, as shown in Figure 3 . At stage 1, a content provider has a database of movies. The content provider sends the movies in encrypted form to its users through the public Internet (insecure) at stage 2. At stage 3, the users receive this encrypted movie. In existing DRM systems, users store these encrypted movies, along with the decryption keys on their PC or portable media players, which typically do not provide adequate protection for these keys. As a result, these movies may be easily copied and proliferated through the Internet. However, if the users store these movies onto their NCdisk, then those movies will not be easily copied in their original highquality digital plaintext form. Instead, the movies can only be viewed through the NCdisk and one of three pre-defined type of outputs. The NCdisk can provide both security for the content providers and convenience for the users. The NCdisk can be used to replace the current DVD-by-mail rental services such as NetflixTm and BlockbusterTM. These service providers currently mail millions of DVDs to all their users each week. Instead, these service providers could mail to each user a single NCdisk. Using this NCdisk, the users can download their desired movies without having to wait for DVDs by mail, and the content providers will have the assurance that their movies cannot be mass copied in their original plaintext digital form.
We present a security protocol to use along with the NCdisk for an online movie download application, as shown in Table 3 . When the NCdisk is manufactured, it is completely empty. It has no movies stored on it, and its SoC registers and memory are void of keys and software. The manufacturer ships these blank NCdisks to the movie content provider, who is the trusted party in our model. The 5 paragraphs below refer to parts (a) through (e) in Table 3 .
The content provider installs an initialization software on the NCdisk that will self generate a random device key and store it in the device key register, load up the trusted TSM software, write in a unique serial number (SN) identifying the NCdisk, and load up the shared key that the content provider shares with the NCdisk. Afterwards, the content provider can remove the initialization software. Note movie download, using the NCdisk to provide greater copy-2. User j connects Dj online to C' s website protection and privacy-protection for sensitive data.
3. C reads SN from Dj. C has a database that associates each SN with a CDKj, which C shares with Dj. Using
